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25X1

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25X1

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CONTENTS

25X1

Poland: Party leader Gomulka may have won first round in struggle against hard-line party elements.
(Page 2)

Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek "action program" is one of the most progressive reforms ever tried by a Communist government. (Page 3)

Cuba: Castro's speech was probably intended to mollify his Communist critics at home and abroad.
(Page 5)

Berlin: Dutschke shooting (Page 6)

25X1

Turkey: Anti-NATO demonstrations (Page 7)

Spain: Rumors (Page 7)

Rhodesia: No majority rule (Page 7)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011000110001-6

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011000110001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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***Poland:** Party leader Gomulka may have won the first round of the struggle against hard-line party elements led by Interior Minister Moczar.

Except for the shift of Gomulka's close associate, former defense chief Spychalski, to the ceremonial post of head of state, none of the changes announced at the three-day parliamentary session which ended yesterday adversely affected Gomulka supporters.

The appointment of three new deputy defense ministers, none of whom is associated with the hard-line faction, appears to be a victory for Gomulka's moderate line. All three appointees will be able to work with Spychalski's successor, General Jaruzelski. They are acceptable to the Soviets. The manner in which these appointments were announced also suggests that the hard-line candidate for Spychalski's former job, deputy defense minister Korczynski, may have been ousted from the ministry.

Both deputy ministers of foreign affairs were replaced by men who are believed to be moderates. The former deputies, one a pro-Western moderate and the other a tough Soviet-oriented administrator, reportedly had been under attack by hard-line elements, who probably were hoping to replace them with their own men.

All these appointments appear to give new impetus to Gomulka's efforts to reassert his authority in the party and perhaps even to construct a new factional balance. It is still uncertain, however, whether Gomulka will be able to bring the turmoil in the party under control. For example, he has not yet responded to the demands of the younger reformist elements within the party.

[Redacted]

Czechoslovakia: The party "action program" emerged from six days of central committee debate as one of the most progressive reforms yet attempted by a Communist government.

Essentially, the approved version, which is somewhat less forthright than the original outline, is a program for transition. Its compromises reflect the fears of many of the central committee members, who were appointed under the Novotny regime, of altering the status quo too quickly. In addition, the program as revised is an attempt to allay Moscow's fears that the Communists might lose control of the situation.

The program provides for guarantees of personal rights and freedoms, including freedom of speech and travel and work abroad. It calls for a court system independent of political influences and for electoral reforms. It also recommends constitutional changes which will result in a federated Czech-Slovak state, thus giving Slovakia greater freedom. In a similar vein, it offers new hope to formerly repressed minorities, even including Germans.

The civil police will be brought under control of local governments, and the secret police are henceforth to concern themselves exclusively with foreign intelligence. Domestic matters will presumably become the responsibility of the civil police.

Most of the compromises will affect the pace and scope of economic reform, suggesting that this was the price for keeping intact the sections on personal freedoms. In general, the changes mean a more gradual approach to solving economic problems than the liberals wanted.

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25X1

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The foreign policy section is brief, but it reaffirms positions previously taken by the Dubcek regime, and reflects no compromises, except perhaps in its somewhat ambiguous tone. Nevertheless, it appears clear that henceforth, Czechoslovakia's interests will be the primary consideration in the formulation of foreign policy, even though Prague also will consider the interests of Moscow and other Communist capitals.

25X1

12 Apr 68

4

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011000110001-6

25X1

Cuba: Fidel Castro's speech on 9 April, in which he implied a change in his theory on revolution, was probably tailored to mollify his Communist critics at home and abroad.

By praising the role of the urban population in the Cuban revolution, Castro qualified his previous thesis that rural-based insurgency is the ultimate form of revolutionary struggle. He acknowledged that "different points of view, different theses" exist within all revolutionary movements. He also claimed that a strong "mass movement" was already developing in Cuba before 1958, but "it just turned out" that the rebel army developed more fully and achieved the final victory with the support of the rural people.

The speech was obviously aimed at city dwellers who have borne the brunt of Castro's current "revolutionary offensive." Many of them have been serving "voluntary" tours of duty in the cane fields. In contrast to two militant speeches in March, in which he harangued his urban audience about their "counter-revolutionary tendencies," his latest speech is a call for them to join in the "revolutionary offensive" in order to make 1968 the "triumph of the revolution."

Moscow and the pro-Soviet parties in Latin America may see in Castro's speech a concession to their advocacy of a prime role for the urban masses in the revolutionary struggle. Other major points of difference, including Cuba's insistence on exporting revolution, show no signs of being resolved, however, despite recent assessments that Castro may be reconsidering his tactics.

25X1

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NOTES

Berlin: Yesterday's near fatal shooting of dissident student leader Rudi Dutschke, which sparked an attack on the Springer newspaper plant in West Berlin, may embolden leftist students who are already planning anti-American demonstrations over the Easter weekend. American policy in Vietnam has been the target of Easter demonstrations in the past, and this year several groups also planned to protest the murder of Martin Luther King. Demonstrators may try to link the two incidents and what was previously expected to be low-key peace protests may be marked by more serious civil disobedience.

2 X1

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Turkey: Leftist elements in Turkey, led by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party, may attempt anti-NATO demonstrations "of significant proportions" in Istanbul and Izmir during the next few weeks. They have already launched a major propaganda campaign against Turkey's continued participation in NATO, and indoor protest meetings have been planned. Turkish security leaders fear that such gatherings may get out of hand and anti-American incidents could result.

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Spain: Franco's inaction in the face of a deteriorating economic situation has led to widespread rumors in Madrid that senior military officers are considering some sort of move. The US Embassy discounts this possibility but notes persistent rumors of imminent cabinet changes. Franco may reshuffle his cabinet in an attempt to head off rising discontent, but he would probably try to maintain the same balance of political forces.

25X1

Rhodesia: The regime's constitutional commission has made a new proposal that would effectively bar even eventual African majority rule. The proposal envisions franchise qualifications that would postpone parity for generations. The commission's recommendations must still be reviewed by the government and the ruling political party before a new constitution is put to a referendum dominated by white voters. If adopted, the constitution would make it almost impossible for British Prime Minister Wilson to keep alive the faint hope of a negotiated settlement.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 11 April 1968
approved the following national intelligence estimates:

SNIE 76.1-68 "The Outlook for Internal Security
 in Ethiopia" [redacted]


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NIE 29.1-68 "Greece" [redacted]

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